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THE U.S. - JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE:
WILL IT SURVIVE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER?

BY

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- What roles should the United States and Japan undertake to promote stability in the emerging world order?

The paper provides an overview of Japan's economy, concept of security, political system, and pacifist outlook as background. The paper then traces the evolution of the Security Alliance, analyzes the current military threat, and concludes there still are valid military reasons for the alliance to continue. The political perspective is analyzed next from the standpoint of burdensharing, the changing political climate, and Japan's Persian Gulf contributions. The paper concludes the alliance offers beneficial advantages to both parties despite charged political issues. Lastly, the study suggests the United States and Japan should focus on three roles to promote stability in the new world order:

- becoming more equal partners in a shared world vision
- solving world problems and not each others
- learning to live in a multi-polar world

It's not just security issues that underwrite the alliance; it's also issues of political stability, democracy, human rights, economic prosperity, and economic stability. The alliance provides the best framework to meet the challenges of the new world order.

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THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE:
WILL IT SURVIVE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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ABSTRACT

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One candidate is the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan commonly referred to as the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. Now that the Cold War is over, is this treaty still relevant? Given Japan's economic miracle, should the United States continue to provide Japan's national security and protect Japan's vital interests? This paper examines the treaty from three perspectives:

- Is the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance still relevant in the emerging world order from a military perspective?
- Is the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance still relevant from a political perspective?
- What roles should the United States and Japan undertake to promote stability in the emerging world order?

The paper provides an overview of Japan's economy, concept of security, political system, and pacifist outlook as background. The paper then traces the evolution of the Security Alliance, analyzes the current military threat, and concludes there still are valid military reasons for the alliance to continue. The political perspective is analyzed next from the standpoint of burdensharing, the changing political climate, and Japan's Persian Gulf contributions. The paper concludes the alliance offers beneficial political advantages to both parties despite

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, charged political issues. Lastly, the study suggests the United States and Japan should focus on three roles to promote stability in the new world order:

- becoming more equal partners in a shared world vision.
- solving world problems and not each others.
- learning to live in a multi-polar world.

It's not just security issues that underwrite the alliance; it's also issues of political stability, democracy, human rights, economic prosperity, and economic stability. The alliance provides the best framework to meet the challenges of the new world order.

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CHAPTER ONE:
AN EMERGING NEW WORLD ORDER

THE VISION

When George Bush took office in January 1989, he spoke of a new world order. Although largely vague about the details of his vision, if recent events are predictors, his new world order may be more physical than ideological. Characteristics of the emerging new world order are:

- The end of the Cold War may not necessarily bring international harmony due to reemergence of regional antagonisms, ethno-nationalism and fundamentalism.
- Striking contradictions will exist. Power will be diffused--the U.S. and Soviet Union will no longer dominate the international arena. Increased cooperation between major powers will occur because of greater interdependence. Force, when exerted to resolve conflicts, will be swift and proportional to the technology available to the participants. More nations will have weapons of mass destruction--increasing the nuclear club from five to 15 nations.
- The information revolution will continue eroding a nation's traditional ideas of boundaries and national sovereignty.
- Economic power will displace military power as the primary determinant of national security and influence.¹

This description illustrates the complexity and diversity of the international arena in which the national security environment must now be viewed. No sooner was the end of the Cold War acknowledged, than public and Congressional demands for a peace dividend immediately captured the headlines. Now, more than ever, world events mandate a scrupulous review of our national security strategy--designed for the Cold War--to meet the challenges of the New World Order.

WHERE TO FOCUS

Some might argue European strategies should be the first to undergo a review. Yet, as one author noted, "These global trends, brought so

sharply into focus in Europe this past year, have long been at work in Asia."³

Figure 1 shows some of the key issues and challenges that Asia--an area of expanding economic and strategic importance--offers

to United States (U.S.) policy makers.

Admiral Hardisty, former Commander-In-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, calls the importance of the Pacific to the U.S.




Figure 1: Asia's Key Issues and Challenges

"indisputable," noting that seven out of 10 mutual defense treaties and seven of the world's largest armies are in the Pacific.⁴ He believes the economic future of the U.S. is "inextricably tied to the prosperity of the Pacific," citing that U.S. trade with the Pacific has exceeded that with Europe for the last 17 consecutive years.⁵ Trade between the U.S. and Asia is now 50 percent greater than trade with Europe.⁶

He isn't the first to have this strategic vision. Elihu Root, founder of the U.S. Army War College, had a vision of the Pacific's importance at the turn of the century. He said, "The Mediterranean is the sea of the past, the Atlantic is the sea of the present and the Pacific is the sea of the future."⁷

Another great American, General Douglas MacArthur, had this to say: "The history of the world for the next thousand years will be written in the Pacific."⁸

MacArthur said,
"The history of the
world for the next
thousand years will
be written in the
Pacific."

"The Mediterranean is the sea of the past, the Atlantic is the sea of the present, and the Pacific is the sea of the future"

- Elihu Root

Innumerable sources concur the Pacific is rapidly taking center stage in the international arena--leaving Europe to pale in comparison.

Key to U.S. Pacific policy is the relationship with Japan. The bilateral relations between Japan and the United States now rival the importance of those with the

Soviet Union.⁹ Economically, the combined Gross National Products (GNP) of the United States and Japan account for almost 40 percent of the world's wealth.¹⁰ Security arrangements between the two countries have existed since 1951 with substantially few changes.

Specifically, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (hereafter referred to as the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, or simply the Security Alliance) between the U.S. and Japan is a good candidate for review. In effect since 1960, this treaty evolved to implement our strategy of containment during the Cold War. Now that the Cold War is over, is this treaty still needed? Does it meet the demands of the new world order if one believes the Persian Gulf may be typical of future events. Will the domestic and the Congressional climate--at odds with Japan over a litany of issues--continue to accept Japan's limited contributions to international peacekeeping efforts in general, and current contributions to future U.S. defense efforts in the Pacific specifically? The Persian Gulf adds an incentive to review security relationships with Japan because of the superficial appearance that the U.S. defended Japan's access to oil. Such rhetoric--already in progress--will likely increase after the results of the conflict are scrutinized.

THREE QUESTIONS

This paper's objective is to discuss three questions relevant to future national security strategy and the emerging new world order. These questions are:

- Is the Security Alliance still relevant in the emerging new world order from a military perspective?
- Is the Security Alliance still relevant in the emerging new world order from a political perspective?
- What roles should the United States and Japan undertake to promote stability in the emerging new world order?

There are no simple and direct answers to any one of these questions. The issues and perspectives might be the most relevant part of this research effort. Most issues are so intertwined with facts, fictions, perceptions, emotions, ancillary issues and self-serving interests that a simple analysis is difficult. Thus, the U.S.-Japan bilateral security relationship cannot be entirely isolated from economic and political issues. Chapter Two provides an overview of Japan's economy and political system. Chapter Three examines the Security Alliance in detail concluding with some military perspectives on continuing this alliance. Chapter Four examines burdensharing during the Cold War and the Persian Gulf and presents some political perspectives on continuing the alliance. Finally, Chapter Five looks to the future--on the roles the United States and Japan should undertake in the emerging new world order.

CHAPTER TWO
AN OVERVIEW OF JAPAN¹




Figure 2: Orientation Map

Lying off the east coast of Asia is Japan, a string of rugged, mountainous islands stretching for 3,200 kilometers. Consisting of four major islands--Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu--about four-fifths of the nation is mountainous.

Only 19 percent of the

nation is arable. The climate varies from subtropical to temperate. Crowded into this rugged terrain is 120 million Japanese--317 persons per square kilometer. Although Japan has a diversity of natural resources, the limited quantity and quality render these resources virtually valueless. One of Japan's greatest feats has been to overcome this limitation through the ingenuity, skill and initiative of her people to become one of the world's most mature industrial economies.²

This chapter examines six areas of interest pertinent to this study:

- The development of the economy since World War II;
- The relation of the economy to national security;
- Japan's vulnerability with respect to imports;
- The importance of exports to economic health;
- Japan's political system; and
- Japan's pacifist attitude.

BUILDING AN ECONOMY FROM THE RUINS

Japan lay in ruins following World War II. Forty percent of her industrial plants were destroyed and economic production was reduced to levels of almost fifteen years earlier.³ The political leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) saw economic stability as the means to promote national stability and unity, to shore up national security and, more importantly, to eliminate the chances of opposing factions to develop a rallying cause.⁴ The LDP approached economic stability with a practical and achievable plan that used scientific principles, borrowed Western technology and implemented policies designed to promote extensive international trade.⁵ Their goal was to catch the West using the Gross National Product (GNP) as the measure of success.⁶ Since 1952, the government played an important role in industrial development by providing credit and funding, and more importantly, by designing policies to protect emerging industries from foreign competition.⁷ The first industries to develop were the chemical and heavy manufacturing industries.⁸

This approach was not only practical, it was also farsighted given Japan's limited resources and arable land yet abundant population.⁹ The focus on trade provided materials, technology and markets. Emphasis on developing the chemical and heavy industries as well as trade promoted growth.¹⁰ Japan's GNP grew an average of 8.7 percent per year during the 1950s and increased to an average 10.3 percent during the 1960s.¹¹ By 1963, Japan had the third largest economy in the world after the United

States and the Soviet Union.¹² By the mid 1980s, Japan had become the second largest economy. Figure 3 illustrates the tremendous growth of the Japanese economy compared to selected western countries.

Japan was in a unique world situation. Because the United States had ensured national security by treaty since 1952, Japan could concentrate solely on economic development.¹⁴ National security was such a remote concern some foreign observers commented the




Figure 3: GNP Growth Trends¹³

Japanese "assumed that security and water can be obtained free."¹⁵ Security, coupled with cheap materials, allowed Japan's share of the total world exports to increase from a 3.6 percent share in 1960 to an 8.2 percent share in 1978.¹⁶ As the chemical and heavy industries matured in the early 1970s, Japan turned to research and high technology areas such as bioengineering, electronics, robotics and atomic-energy equipment--hoping to achieve decisive breakthroughs to further gain on the West.¹⁷

A NEW CONCEPT OF SECURITY

A changing international environment in the 1970s forced Japan to re-think her outlook on national security.¹⁸ Five events led to a new outlook on national security.

First, came the Nixon shocks. In 1971, President Nixon removed the United States from its role as the world banker by suspending the dollar convertibility features covered under the International Monetary Fund's General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.¹⁹ Part of the reason behind this suspension was the decline of the U.S.'s economic position relative to other nations who had perceivably gained at U.S. expense.²⁰

Then came the second major shock--also by Nixon--as the U.S. normalized relations with the Peoples Republic of China in 1972 without prior consultation with the Japanese.²¹

Third, the rapid decolonization process throughout the 1960s led to a rapid increase in the number of new countries.²² A new world economic order was emerging. The new countries wanted to participate in the economic decision making process and sought to maintain their rights to the resources within their boundaries.²³ They sought to guarantee export earnings by raising or stabilizing commodity prices and calling for the transfer of real resources and technology.²⁴ By the 1970s, countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Brazil had achieved some world economic importance and were growing faster than many advanced countries including Japan.²⁵

Fourth, supply interruptions led to constraints on economic growth of resource importing nations.²⁶ In this period, Japan suffered from the oil crisis of 1973 and from a U.S. embargo on soybeans.²⁷ After twenty years of nearly continuous growth,

Japan's GNP stalled in 1974 at zero percent growth--down from a previous five year average of 9.1 percent.²⁸

Finally, the last change leading to a revised view on national security was the decline of U.S. military superiority compared to the Soviet Union as the Soviets began to increase their presence in the Far East.²⁹

These changes, and Japan's continual emphasis on her economy, led to an expanded concept of national security to accommodate supply interruptions of raw materials, sudden price hikes and food embargoes.³⁰ Though never officially formulated as a policy, comprehensive security emerged in 1978 when Prime Minister Ohira remarked, "Japan's security has to be comprehensive . . . we can only maintain security effectively when not only military power but also political power, dynamic economic strength, creative culture, and a thorough-going diplomacy are well combined."³¹

One could argue that this unformulated policy has in fact been implemented *vis a vis* the character and actions of some of Japan's efforts since 1978. Such a review is beyond the scope of this effort. What is important to appreciate, however, is that Ohira's statement perhaps subtly reflected a shift in previous Japanese concepts of national values and foreign policy. Japan developed an acute awareness of her own vulnerabilities and renewed recognition of the need for trade.

JAPAN'S IMPORT VULNERABILITY

Major sectors within the Japanese economy are manufacturing, services, domestic trade and construction. Figure 4 depicts the relative size and makeup of the economy for 1985. Of note is the relative size of the manufacturing sector to the other components.

The manufacturing sector was extremely important in the development of Japan's economic strength because it provided the majority of export commodities. This





Figure 4: Major Economic Sectors³³

Providing almost 30 percent of GDP, most industries produce for the domestic market although exports are important for selected industries such as electronics, automotive, chemical and textile industries.³⁴ Interestingly, the structure of the manufacturing sector changed during the 1970s as a result of the oil embargo in 1973. Resource-intensive industries such as metals, petroleum refining, coal products, pulp and paper--once rapid growth industries--stagnated. Labor-intensive industries--textiles, general machinery and light manufacturing--suffered from slowed productivity rates and subsequently declined.

Technology intensive industries--chemical, electrical, automotive and precision equipment--moved to the forefront and underwent rapid growth and development.

Japan's economy appears to be in transition again fueled by the decline of the dollar and the strength of the yen, the increasing barriers to Japanese exports by her major trading partners and by future opportunities offered by diversified manufacturing operations in newly industrializing countries. The economy is moving more towards a service and financial orientation and away from manufacturing.³⁵



How can a nation described as "resource poor" survive let alone thrive? In Japan's case, the answer is imports. Virtually every raw material necessary for the manufacturing sector is imported. Figure 5

shows the composition of Japan's imports. Note that mineral fuels account for 29 percent of Japan's total import bill. Japan is about 82 percent dependent on imports for the production of energy.³⁷ Energy imports break down into a 99 percent dependency on crude oil imports, a 92 percent dependency on natural gas imports and an 82 percent dependency on coal imports.³⁸ Because

so many materials are imported, Japan is virtually dependent upon foreign sources of raw materials. Being so resource dependent imparts a sense of overwhelming vulnerability--a sense that catastrophic economic or military consequences could result from interruptions to supply.³⁹

Japan's response to limit vulnerability took three approaches: actions to ensure stable sources of supply; conservation; and last, pursuit of alternate sources of energy.⁴⁰ In the first approach, Japan diversified sources of supply, implemented long-term purchase contracts, direct foreign investments and developed stockpiles of critical materials. Japan's conservation efforts typify a difference in perspectives between the U.S. and Japan. Japan, viewing conservation as a national resource rather than a sacrifice of quality and quantity, continued to increase her GNP--over 30 percent since 1973--without equivalent increases in energy consumption!⁴¹ Pursuing alternative energy sources, Japan switched energy generation from oil to coal, natural gas and nuclear energy.

THE ROLE OF EXPORTS IN THE ECONOMY

Japan's prowess in exports is now well established worldwide. Exports, while being a major avenue for growth, are not important to the national economy for earning power alone.⁴² For example, Japan's exports run about 15 percent of GDP--less than the most other Western countries except the United States. By comparison, the export share of GNP for France, Italy, England, West Germany and Canada range, lowest to highest, between 20 and 30 percent.

The United States exports only about 10 percent of its GNP. However, exports are critically important to certain Japanese industries, more so than the aggregated figure indicates. For example, Figure 6 illustrates the composition of exports for a recent year. Exports account for almost 50 percent of automobile production, machine tools and television receivers. Seventy five percent of watch and camera production are exported.

If earning power is not the most important aspect of exports in the national economy, what is? The real importance of exports is their purchasing power to buy more imported raw materials.




Figure 6: Export Composition⁴⁸

This cycle--raw materials imports, manufacturing and exports--is the heart of Japan's economic engine. Seventy-seven percent of Japan's imports are raw materials, energy resources, or agricultural products.⁴⁴ Ensuring access and stable supplies of needed raw materials and preserving the means to pay through exports is one of Japan's highest national priorities.⁴⁵

Japan's political system is a key component in achieving this priority.

JAPAN'S POLITICS

Japan is a parliamentary democracy. Although Japan seats an Emperor, he is little more than a notional figure head. Real power is exercised by the politicians and bureaucrats. Japan has a bicameral legislature called the Diet. From this brief description, one might immediately conclude Japan's government is very similar to our own or that of Britain.

Becoming increasingly obvious to the West, especially to the United States, is the difference in the political process as practiced in Japan. From the U.S.'s perspective, we expect the political process in Japan to work similar to how ours works. That is, the President advances or takes up an issue; the issue is resolved through public debate via the media and within the halls of Congress; and the nation moves forward. The overall process takes place within the framework of the constitution where the laws of the land reign supreme. Apparently, Japan's political process may not correlate to ours. From my research, there is little basis to believe the Prime Minister in Japan leads his nation in a similar manner to our President or even in a similar manner as the British Prime Minister. First of all, the power of the Prime Minister is limited. Partially, this may result because Japan's constitution does not define a political system in the our vein, i.e., where laws prevail over civil authority.⁴⁶ Secondly, the Prime Minister's power is limited because power is shared with a highly informal bureaucratic structure and personal networks aimed at control over a

disorderly world.⁴⁷ Third, the Prime Minister's power is diffused because of factionalism within the political parties.⁴⁸ Even though the LDP has been the ruling party since 1955, it no longer commands the strong popular and unified support it once enjoyed. These limitations contrast with our system. An even greater contrast exists in the actual decision making process.

While generally acknowledged that the decision process in Japan is based upon the practice of "consensus," or *ringisei*, what is not well recognized is how this process works.⁴⁹ From various sources, the process can best be described as avoiding direct confrontation during the decision review process such that the final position may bear little resemblance to the starting outline.⁵⁰ It is more important for all concerned parties to have a stake in the decision process than the outcome of the final decision. One example of this process is the formulation of the national defense plan. According to Harrison Holland in his book, Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma, given Japan's bureaucratic history and structure, each bureaucrat and politician has:

... staked out his own area of jurisdiction; each has a certain expertise to bring to budget formulation; each has developed the knowledge and ability to negotiate, to compromise, and to rationalize policy; and each has his own conception of the national interest and what is the best defense policy for Japan."⁵¹

While everyone may not agree on an issue, reaching consensus is important to finding acceptance even though the only consensus may be that no other decision is possible.⁵² This decision process markedly contrasts to our system of majority rule.

Another difference is the power of the electorate to influence the actions of the government. American policy makers assume public policy debates take place in Japan on issues and future roles; however, this also may not be the case.⁵³ While public opposition can topple incumbent Japanese governments, it's as a result of emotionalism versus shaping events through objective analysis of the issues. Dutch journalist, Karel Von Wolferen, a long-time resident of Japan, notes that the Japanese media rarely offers analytical reporting on the informal relations and actions between government and business bureaucrats who really determine policies.⁵⁴ Japan's bureaucracy is coming and more to be viewed as an obstacle in translating public will into action according to former Ambassador to Japan, Frank McNeil.⁵⁵

Japan's outlooks on defense and foreign policy also represent differences in outlooks from those of the United States. Japan's approach toward national security is one illustration. Harrison Holland noted that "for the past decade, Japan's defense policy has had essentially two faces--one for the Japanese public and the other for the United States."⁵⁶ This dichotomy has caused problems and misunderstandings. Interactions in the international environment represent a second difference. Japan, while wanting to be an equal partner commensurate with her economic stature, makes only limited contributions in the international forum, leaving responsibilities and initiatives to others.⁵⁷ Japan's bureaucrats and business interests are not interested in any outside problems beyond how their economy and

informal power system interact according to Van Wolferen.⁵³ Japan is reluctant to exercise economic sanctions against any nation, recognizing her own vulnerabilities.⁵⁹ A third difference is Japan's view toward human rights and the democratization of developing countries since 1976. Japan does not view human rights issues in the same light as the U.S. and feels the U.S. is extremely inconsistent on the human rights issue.⁶⁰ One example is China. Japan is satisfied with current progress toward democratization whereas the U.S. would like to see more.⁶¹ Yet a fourth difference is the perspective from which both nations view the breakup of the communist bloc. The U.S. views the breakup as an affirmation that the containment strategy worked, i.e., a military orientation to ensure national security; Japan, however, views the breakup as a result of market-driven economic growth, i.e., an economic orientation to ensure national security.⁶²

In summary, the Japanese political process might be characterized as an oligarchy--where a small and tightly knit vertically structured group operates as a unit in competition with other groups.⁶³ A recent author compared the operation of the Japanese government more like a trading company than a nation state and one without a true foreign policy.⁶⁴ Still another characterized the Japanese government as without a top--that is, an institution without jurisdiction over its components.⁶⁵ Whether or not any of these characterizations are accurate, it is

accurate to conclude the Japanese government functions in ways different from what the U.S. expects.

This brief overview of Japan's political system is meant to illustrate the Japanese may seek entirely different ends for entirely different reasons than the United States. Thus, misreading motives can cause disagreements and misunderstandings about mutual interests. Objective analysis of the issue may suffer in the end.

JAPAN'S PACIFIST OUTLOOK

In 1947, Japan adopted its constitution under the guidelines provided by General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur laid out three major provisions that were incorporated into the Japanese Constitution.⁶⁶ First, MacArthur clarified the role of the emperor--he would no longer be a god but would function as a constitutional sovereign responsible to the people. Secondly, MacArthur stipulated the feudal system would cease to exist. Third, and most controversial, MacArthur provided this note:

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection. No Japanese army, navy, or air force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force.⁶⁷

To a nation totally defeated in war, occupied by a foreign army and guilt-ridden from past excesses, this ideal had appeal. These thoughts were incorporated into Article IX of the constitution almost verbatim. Article IX reads:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized.⁶⁸

Challenges to this article later surfaced when General MacArthur directed the Japanese authorities to establish a police reserve to replace American forces deployed from Japan to Korea. Attempts to amend Article IX by the Diet during the 1950s failed to obtain the requisite two-thirds vote.⁶⁹

So how could commitments to security treaties and development of self defense forces proceed if Article IX was never amended? The answer lies in the interpretation by successive governments and by a ruling of the Japanese Supreme Court on what "war potential" meant.⁷⁰ In 1959, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of a U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Though Article IX renounced war and prohibited war potential, the court ruled:

. . . the above in no way denies the inherent right of self-defense, which our country possesses as a sovereign nation, and the pacifism of our Constitution has never provided for either defenselessness or nonresistance...If there are to be guarantees of the security of our country in order to preserve its peace and security, it is natural that we be able to select...appropriate measures and methods regarded as suitable under existing international conditions, Article IX of the Constitution in no way prohibits a request to another country for security for the⁷¹ maintenance of peace and safety of our country.

Interestingly, the Court only addressed the issue of Article IX from the viewpoint of the constitutionality of the Security

Treaty; it did not decide whether or not self defense forces in themselves were constitutional.⁷³

The government at the time enunciated several principles which are still followed to this day.⁷⁴ These principles include no offensive weapons, no overseas deployment of troops, no collective security arrangements and no conscription for military service. Additionally, as a matter of political policy, Japan subscribes to three non-nuclear principles--no possession, no production and no introduction.

In practice, governments have used Article IX very adroitly, judging applicability from the standpoint of each international situation as it arises.⁷⁴

Today, Japanese Defense Policy articulates the limitations of Article IX on defense efforts.⁷⁵ Basically, the policy acknowledges the precepts of Article IX yet recognizes the nation's inherent right of self defense when it is attacked by a foreign power or powers. The right of self defense will be exercised only when:

- there has been a sudden and illegitimate act of aggression;
- non military means to deal with the aggression are to no avail; and
- self defense efforts used are confined to a minimum.

The policy also restricts self defense forces from possessing "offensive weapons" such as ICBMs, long-range strategic bombers and offensive aircraft carriers.

SUMMARY

This chapter provided an overview of Japan. Japan's economic revitalization after World War II has been miraculous. Achieving success in the economic arena has tempered her outlook on the pillars of national security. Whereas the U.S. views national security to rest upon the military, political and economic elements, buttressed by the national will, Japan's viewpoint decidedly rests upon the economic element. Because Japan lacks virtually every necessary raw material needed for modern industry, extensive imports of raw materials are necessary. Political shocks in the early 1970s, coupled with the end of colonialism and interrupted raw material flow, stagnated a previously robust economy and forged a revised concept of national security. Focusing on exports as a means to pay for raw material imports, Japan embarked upon a period of growth. Her political process further promotes economic growth. Finally, the peace article of Japan's constitution imposes two roles relative to her view of world interaction--one, a genuine interest in peace, and the second, a restraining limit on international efforts.

CHAPTER THREE THE SECURITY ALLIANCE: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

The present U.S.-Japan Security Alliance has been in effect since 1960. Some question whether an alliance formed at the height of the Cold War can still be valid as old barriers collapse and rivalries give way to embracing cooperation. Others question whether an alliance built around a steady threat can meet the dynamic threat expected in the new world order. Yet, others pose a more fundamental question--how can a nation that renounces war as an instrument of political power even be party to any military alliance? But, as the Persian Gulf shows, there is still a need for military forces and the will to use them despite a world of good intentions and respect for international principles and law.

The evolution of the present alliance provides interesting parallels for today. This chapter examines the historical evolution of the alliance. Is the alliance still needed? Does it meet the threats expected in a dynamic world order? There are military reasons to continue the alliance because of threats. However, military reasons alone would not continue or disband the alliance. Political reasons must be considered. While the political necessities of the Cold War may have disappeared, newer challenges such as the Persian Gulf establish some new political realities. Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm are not the first challenges to Japan's security interests nor

are they going to be the last. Can this and future challenges be met through the existing alliance? A discussion of this question puts the issue in perspective.

THE ORIGINS OF THE ALLIANCE

The Original Security Treaty

When World War II was over, people all over the world hoped for a new international order to renounce the militarist and fascist ideologies preceding the war. Japan, maybe at the insistence of conquering General Douglas MacArthur, drafted a "Peace Constitution" that renounced war as an instrument of political power under Article IX. Many hopes were shattered when the true colors of a former war ally, the Soviet Union, unfurled--forcing a review of Japan's idealism.

When war broke out on the Korean Peninsula in 1950, more pragmatic views prevailed. There was need for Japan in the U.S.'s Pacific policy. Japan's strategic location offered an ideal staging area for the conflict in Korea. Even General MacArthur had second thoughts about a totally pacifist Japan.¹ He stated that Article IX was "aimed entirely at eliminating Japanese aggression."² After directing American troops from Japan to Korea, he ordered the Japanese government to form a police reserve of approximately 75,000 men. He explained his actions and rationale to the Japanese people in January 1951 by commenting that the ideal to renounce war "must give way to the overwhelming law of self-preservation;" Japan, he said, must "mount force to repel force."³ To American planners following

the Korean War, the strategic location made Japan ideal to contain Communist forces in China, those remaining in North Korea and the potential threat of increased forces massing in the eastern Soviet Union. However, to the Japanese, many saw the end of the Peace Constitution imminent. The more realistic, however, saw that Japan did not have even the barest of chances to even defend her right to survival. There was an obvious need for the U.S. to provide a security umbrella.

In September 1951, the United States and Japan signed a Peace Treaty that concluded World War II with all the 48 nations Allied nations except the Soviet Union.⁴ At the same time, a Security Treaty went into effect between the United States and Japan. Curiously, Japanese sovereignty was not yet restored by either treaty. The new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in his summary statement on the Security Treaty to the Senate, said:

It is in the minds of the parties that the present bilateral arrangement is only an initial step in an evolutionary process . . . It is to be presumed that the United States would welcome developments which would reduce Japan's initial, almost total, dependence on the United States for security.

Dulles foresaw the day when Japan would regain a place in the world to include a military of some capability. The preamble for the treaty read:

The USA should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan . . . in the expectation that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding⁶ any armament which could be of an offensive nature.

In April 1952, Japanese sovereignty was fully restored. To many, the Security Treaty under the Peace Treaty of 1951 was an alliance imposed upon the Japanese by an army of occupation since the American Forces stationed in Japan had virtually the same rights they enjoyed under occupation status.

In 1954, the U.S. and Japan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement to establish a legal basis for the U.S. to furnish technology and military equipment to Japan.⁸ Japan also committed to undertake the military obligations for self-defense required under the Security Treaty and to develop her military capabilities.

The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

In 1958 the U.S. and Japan began negotiations to revise the Security Treaty. At the heart of the negotiations were Japanese desires to correct unequal features of the 1951 Security Treaty. Several issues were of concern; most centered on the issue of sovereignty. Honorable J. Graham Parsons, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, cited the following inequities to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

The United States is permitted to use bases without consulting the Japanese Government for actions in other parts of the Far East that might involve Japan in a war irrespective of Japan's interests and desires.

Second, the United States could bring into Japan whatever weapons she chose regardless of the wishes of the Japanese with regard to their own territory.

Third it provided for the intervention of U.S. forces in large-scale internal disturbances in Japan incompatible with the sovereign status of Japan.

Fourth, there was no specific commitment by the United States to defend Japan in case of attack; the treaty provided she may defend Japan if she chooses.

Fifth, it provided for a United States veto over any arrangements for the entry of the forces of a third power into Japan. This is academic, but it was considered a derogation of sovereignty again.

Finally, . . . there were no provisions for a termination of the treaty except by mutual consent.¹¹

Japan gained her political goals, but the United States failed to get a Japanese commitment on regional defense.¹² The treaty was approved in 1960 and is commonly referred to as the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

Several interesting events accompanied the approval of the Security Alliance.¹³ For example, on the day of the vote in the Diet, Socialist party opposition in the Lower House reportedly kept the Speaker of the House imprisoned for some six hours in an attempt to block the Diet from meeting. Only after the police were summoned did the vote get taken--passing by a simple majority because the opposition members were physically removed. Even of more interest is the fact that the treaty was approved due to a stipulation in the Japanese Constitution that automatically ratifies a treaty if the Upper House of the Diet fails to act within a 30 day period. The treaty touched off massive protests in Japan. Some 62,000 people demonstrated in Tokyo and 220,00 people nationwide took part. Despite this rocky start, the Security Alliance was to endure for the next 30 years.

Treaty Obligations

The major provisions of the alliance are (The entire text of the alliance is attached at Appendix 1):¹⁴

- Article I reaffirmed obligations to the charter of the United Nations (U.N.) to settle international disputes by peaceful means; to refrain from threat or

force against the territories or politics of any State; and to strengthen the U.N. to promote peace and security.

- Article II fosters the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by promoting stability, well-being, economic collaboration, and by eliminating conflicts in international economic policies.
- Article III and IV bind both parties, through their own efforts and through mutual aid, to maintain and develop their capacity to resist armed attacks, subject to constitutional limitations. Article IV also requires the U.S. to "consult" with Japan whenever a threat to Japan's security or a threat to the international peace and security of the Far East arises.
- Article V is perhaps the most controversial from the U.S.'s perspective. Article V states, "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." This article binds the U.S. to defend Japan against armed attack, but does not require Japan to reciprocate in the defense of U.S. forces--even those forces acting to defend Japan.
- Article VI establishes the principle of burdensharing by granting the U.S. the use of facilities and areas in Japan needed for Japan's defense as well as those needed to maintain international peace and security in the Far East. More commonly, this article establishes the basis for the Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) under a separate agreement.
- Articles VII again reasserts the position that this treaty does not conflict with the U.N.
- Article VII and IX describe the ratification and signing procedures.
- Article X discusses treaty duration and termination procedures.

Where is all this going? Remember that national interests drive the formulation of strategies. The U.S.'s perspective at the time of this treaty focused on a national security strategy

of containment. While there may have been some interest in seeing Japan gradually assume a regional defense responsibility, such interest was secondary to containment. Japan's strategy, on the other hand, focused on establishing her rights of sovereignty within the world order, overcoming world opinion for past transgressions, staying within the confines of her peace constitution, and devoting most her energy to building her economic infrastructure. In this regard, with the signing of the Security Alliance in 1960, both the United States and Japan achieved their political goals.

A Reexamination

With the U.S. pre-occupied in Southeast Asia, attitudes about the treaty were relatively complacent until rising nationalistic sentiments about Okinawa during 1968-1970 and the first treaty renewal period forced a reexamination. America's growing disenchantment with world events set the stage to strike a practical bargain. In 1969, the Nixon-Sato accords reverted Okinawa back to Japan in exchange for a "real Japanese self-defense capacity and a continued security treaty."¹³

The shocks--the double Nixon shocks, effects of decolonization, resource interruptions, and the 1973 oil crisis--shook Japan's confidence in the U.S.'s commitment to defend Japan.¹⁴ Her confidence further eroded in the 1970s when President-Elect Carter announced unilateral troop withdrawals from South Korea. Japan acknowledged "peace and security on the Korean Peninsula as very important for the peace and stability of the entire region

of East Asia."¹⁵ Thus, Prime Minister's Ohira's statement on comprehensive security discussed in Chapter Two could be seen as Japan's first determined commitment to fulfill the self-defense roles established by the Security Alliance. His statement also equated to the U.S.'s first success to get Japan interested in a regional security role.

None-the-less, Japan's efforts still failed to meet U.S. expectations as the 1970s drew to a close. Primarily, even though Japan questioned the U.S.'s commitment to her defense, her perception of the threat was different than that of the United States. Japan did not perceive the Soviet Union as a threat to the homeland.

Changing Perceptions of the Threat

Beginning in 1978, Japan's perceptions changed when the Soviets deployed troops to the northern islands, deployed modern weapon systems into the east regions, began expanding and modernizing their Pacific Fleet, made excursions into Ethiopia, Angola, and Vietnam, and in 1979, invaded Afghanistan.¹⁶ The nature of the threat was not only visible, the magnitude was also staggering. Now, Japan not only questioned the U.S.'s commitment to her defense, she now questioned the U.S.'s capability to mount such a defense.¹⁷

Refining Roles and Missions

In a 1981 joint communique with President Reagan, Prime Minister Suzuki acknowledged "the desirability of an appropriate division of roles" in the Security Alliance.¹⁸ He said:

Japan, on its own initiative and in accordance with its constitution and basic defense policy, will seek to take even greater efforts for improving its defense capabilities in Japanese territories and in its surrounding air and sea space, and for further alleviating the financial burden of US forces in Japan.¹⁹

Expounding on this commitment later, Prime Minister Suzuki stated that Japan would defend the air space out several hundred miles from the Japanese shore and defend sea lines of communications (SLOCs) out to a 1,000 nautical miles (see Figure 7).²⁰ This broke from past policies.




Figure 7: New Responsibilities²¹

Suzuki's reference to a U.S.-Japan "alliance" touched off a firestorm of protest in Japan--because of the military implications associated with the word "alliance"--which ultimately forced him to resign.²²

In 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone, Suzuki's successor, reaffirmed this self defense role. In a visit to Washington, he said:

Japan should be an unsinkable aircraft carrier equipped with a tremendous bulwark of defense against the [Soviet] Backfire bombers, and should assert complete and full control of the four [sic] straits that go through the Japanese islands so that there should be no passage of Soviet submarines and other naval activities.²³

Initially, Japan's defensive missions were to provide sea control, including anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and air defense, including air interception roles. Considering that nearly 60 percent of Japan's imports move by sea, keeping the SLOCs open is vital for Japan's well being and survival.¹⁴ One questions, however, whether a 1,000 miles is sufficient since almost all oil traffic to Japan transits the Straits of Malacca.¹⁵

Japan reassessed her defense requirements in the 1980s as a result of a Soviet demonstration of amphibious warfare on one of the northern islands. Gradually, another mission evolved--the capability to resist a limited invasion. Because of the buildup of U.S. military capabilities during the 1980s, her earlier doubts about the resolve of the U.S. to defend her homeland eased considerably. Though Japan no longer doubted that the U.S. would respond in the event of a crisis, there was a question about how soon.¹⁶ Japan is now establishing a capability against limited aggression without outside assistance.

WHAT IS THE CURRENT THREAT?

Despite peace breaking out all over Europe, little has changed in regards to threat capability in Northeast Asia. After 40 years, the interest of the same major powers and several minor ones intersect in this region where a conflict could take on global proportions as shown in Figure 8.¹⁷ At least three of these powers are nuclear capable. What's more, despite announced Soviet reductions in the Far East, these reductions have




Figure 8: Intersecting Interests

primarily occurred in those forces arrayed against China, not those forces arrayed against Japan.²⁸ Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the quality of the weapons arrayed are more modern and are becoming more so every day.²⁹ Naval forces

continue to increase not only in quality, but also in quantity.³⁰

Despite an easing in East-West tensions, a decrease in the Soviet threat in other parts of the world, and even a decrease in the other parts of the Asia-Pacific area such as Vietnam, the Soviet threat does not appear to have reduced significantly against Japan.³¹ In fact, withdrawal back into the Soviet Far East actually increases the amount of traffic around Japan. Naval passages through the straits continue to increase as does violations of Japanese air space.³² For example, over 200 air space violations per year are recorded.³³ The Soviets recognize Japan's pivotal role in the U.S. strategy. They believe their forces are imbalanced. Besides force modernization, the Soviets have employed several other tactics to counter this imbalance. One example is a number of regional arm control proposals to limit deployments, nuclear testing, proliferation of nuclear

weapons, and naval forces--all designed to widen the gap between Japan's and the U.S.'s perceptions of threat.³⁴ Another example is diplomatic. Scheduled for 1991 is a visit by President Gorbachev to Japan who is seeking Japanese technology and aid.³⁵ Figure 9 displays the forces arrayed in Northeast Asia.

The Warfighter's Assessment

The real assessment of threat comes not from journalists' articles, but from the warfighter who must be prepared to fight. Admiral Hardisty, former Commander-In-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, had this to say about the threat environment:




Figure 9: Arrayed Forces³⁶

As a warfighting Commander-In-Chief, I must deal in the real world. Deeds, not promises are what I analyze. The reality is . . . Soviet Pacific forces have improved qualitatively and quantitatively across the board . . . The Soviets continue to upgrade their Air and Naval forces in the Far East Military District. Reorganized air units, revitalized air defenses, the addition of front-line fourth generation fighters, and the addition of

mainstay command and control aircraft are some of the qualitative upgrades designed to modernize Soviet air forces in this theater. The Soviet Pacific fleet remains the largest of the Soviet fleets in terms of surface ships and craft, submarines, and aircraft . . . Soviet troop cuts in Mongolia would not impact on the primary Soviet power projection threats we face, which are naval and air forces. Carriers, amphibious combatants, submarines, cruise missile equipped ships, and long-range bombers are not yet part of Gorbachev's promised cuts.³⁷

The SECDEF's Position: Stay Engaged

Secretary of Defense Cheney added another dimension about why the U.S. should remain engaged in the Asia-Pacific region.

Commenting during a visit to Japan, he said:

The past year's events do not justify dismantling the security structures that have served us so well in the post-war era. What's more, the national interests that led the United States to pursue common policies with Asian friends and allies have never been merely responses to the Soviet Union. We would want to be engaged in the Asia-Pacific region even if the Soviet Union were not. Therefore, it would be a mistake to conclude that we should reduce our activities in Asia because of what's happening in Europe.³⁸

None-the-less, as more and more evidence of collaboration between the U.S. and Soviets emerge, adjustments to U.S. forces--though not necessarily strategy--will likely be implemented.

Most recently, the November 1990 Interim Report to Congress on the Pacific Rim indicated reductions of approximately 14,000 U.S. personnel by the end of 1992.³⁹

Other Factors

There are other factors to consider--as Mr. Cheney pointed out--besides the Soviets for a U.S. presence in the Pacific. More so than Europe and most other regions of the world, a U.S. presence has provided stability in an area where numerous territorial disputes, ethnic rivalries, and religious differences have prevailed for centuries. The positive influence of a U.S. presence on the development of Japan has already been noted. Additionally, unlike Europe where standing armies of several nations stand toe-to-toe against each other, the Pacific area is primarily a maritime theater. Naval and air presence primarily

defines our force structure. Therefore, even if the Soviets reduce their forces, corresponding reductions by the U.S. wouldn't necessarily transpire. Additionally, as Figure 9 illustrated, the Soviets are not the only military threat in the region. Communist China, besides having one of the world's largest standing military forces, is now aggressively developing a "blue water" navy--giving it a force projection capability it previously lacked.⁴⁰ The political situation on the Korean peninsula is largely regarded as the foremost "hot spot" in the Asia-Pacific region even among Asians.⁴¹ And, if the characteristics of the emerging new world order presented in Chapter One are accurate, military conflicts may be more prone to evolve given the absence of the traditional U.S.-Soviet matchup.

Even though the Soviet threat, capabilities and intentions, may decline substantially in the future, many Asian rim nations do not want to see the U.S. precipitously withdraw because they feel instability could result.⁴² Nations such as Australia, Singapore, Thailand, the Republic of Korea and Japan have vigorously reinforced the position of the U.S. as a "welcomed Pacific power."⁴³

POST COLD WAR VALIDITY?

Is the Security Alliance still valid in the post Cold War environment? The Security Alliance was negotiated to meet specific national interests of both countries. Surprisingly, there are substantially little changes. American interests towards Japan at the time of the 1960 alliance were:

- to develop a relationship of mutual confidence to permit the closest possible friendship and cooperation;
- to give full recognition to a broad scope of mutual interests; and
- to advance the cause of peace and freedom throughout the world.⁴⁴

Our interests for the Pacific Region--largely gained through our linchpin relationship with Japan--according to a recent report to Congress, A Strategic Framework for the Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century, differs little from those interests identified above. This report stated:

Despite the decade of changes we foresee, our regional interests in Asia will remain similar to those we have pursued in the past: protecting the United States from attack; supporting our global deterrence policy; preserving our political and economic access; maintaining the balance of power to prevent the rise of any regional hegemony; strengthening the Western orientation of the Asian nations; fostering the growth of democracy and human rights; deterring nuclear proliferation; and ensuring freedom of navigation. The principal elements of our Asian strategy--forward deployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements--will remain valid and essential to maintaining regional stability⁴⁵, deterring aggression, and preserving U.S. interests.

The Military Perspective

Japan's geo-strategic location provides forward operating locations and transit points that remain necessary. Bases in Japan still provide the best deterrent against the Soviet Union, provide a logistics hub for global and regional contingencies, and provide important naval repair facilities.⁴⁶ The present political situation in Korea, the potential loss of bases in the

Philippines, and the military capabilities possessed by the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union argue persuasively for continuing the Security Alliance with Japan from a military perspective.

Continuing the alliance from a Japanese military perspective should also be considered favorably. The alliance, even with U.S. pressures for increased roles and burdensharing, allows Japan to concentrate on economic relations in a security environment largely guaranteed by the United States. It also ensures a U.S. military capability to meet mutual global interests--a capability that Japan does not currently possess.

The current events in the Persian Gulf raise several issues about the Security Alliance and its relevancy in today's emerging world order. One issue is whether or not the alliance supports our military needs. A crisis such as the Persian Gulf does not meet the intent of the treaty which was primarily developed as a defensive agreement. The treaty itself limits military capability to that needed to resist armed attack, subject to constitutional provisions. But, on the other hand, the alliance does work in crisis situations because the U.S. is permitted to use bases in Japan to respond to challenges to international peace and security. As previously discussed, the geo-strategic location of Japan is important. Unequivocally, from a military perspective the existing Security Alliance is still relevant and still needed in the post Cold War environment. Another issue is whether or not the alliance supports our political needs.

Overall, political support is probably the more important issue when it comes to the Persian Gulf and not military support.

The Political Perspective

The political perspective is more complicated. From the U.S.'s perspective, domestic pressure to contract forward deployed forces in favor of a forward presence strategy will increase, barring any overt threats from the Peoples Republic of China or the Soviet Union. Other issues, such as trade and technology, further complicate the political perspective.

From the Japanese political perspective, the Security Alliance might be an increasingly harder pill to swallow domestically. Most informed political leaders see the relationship with the U.S. as in their interests and see these interests best promoted through the Security Alliance. But, such a relationship has a price. American actions could well threaten Japanese foreign interests or even drag Japan into a regional conflict. The Persian Gulf might have been one such example. Still, the Security Alliance provides some very worthwhile political incentives such as the nuclear umbrella and more amicable relations with other Asian neighbors.

In the final analysis, it is the political perspective that will determine whether or not the Security Alliance endures. Two issues will determine the outcome:

- the issue of burdensharing, and
- Japanese burdensharing in the Persian Gulf.

The next chapter examines these issues.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SECURITY ALLIANCE: A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

The last chapter examined the evolution of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. The original alliance was based upon a strategy of containment. It was also an expedient reaction--so that troops could be transferred to Korea from Japan. The present alliance, signed in 1960, met political goals from the Japanese standpoint--resolving issues of sovereignty and promoting a security environment favorable for economic growth. From the U.S.'s viewpoint, the alliance primarily still met military rather than political goals. Only a few farsighted individuals recognized the eventual need for the Japanese to have a military capability so that the U.S. could gradually reduce its security commitments. Changing world events gradually shifted the focus of both Japan and the United States. Japan, perceiving a growing Soviet threat, a declining U.S. capability and mounting U.S. pressures, began to develop more military muscle. The U.S., experiencing domestic strains on the budget, realized policing the world was a costly endeavor. The U.S.'s focus shifted into the political realm.

In Washington, the political rallying cry became "burdensharing," the idea that everyone benefiting from the stable security environment provided by the U.S. since the end of World War II should contribute toward future security efforts.

Washington's rallying cry became "burdensharing"--those who receive shall pay

Burdensharing first surfaced in the Congressional arena in the late 1970s during the Carter years. The thrust of debate initially targeted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. Soon, Japan and the Republic of Korea became targets of discussions. The Carter efforts were largely unsuccessful. Finally, the 100th Congress, under the House Armed Services Committee, convened a bipartisan Defense Burdensharing Panel chaired by Congresswoman Pat Schroeder.

This chapter focuses on three topics. First, it examines burdensharing and its effects on the U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance. Secondly, it examines the Japanese contributions to burdensharing in the Persian Gulf. Third, it presents some political implications about continuing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

BURDENSHARING PERSPECTIVES

The U.S.'s Perspective

Increasingly in the 1980s, the U.S. was in a position of a huge trade imbalance with Japan and a rising budget deficit. Looking for causes, one fact stood out: using defense expenditures as a percent of GNP, the U.S. spent more on defense than any of its allies. In 1986, for example, the U.S.




Figure 10: Defense/GNP Comparisons

spent about 6.7 percent of its GNP on defense compared to an average of 3.3 percent by its NATO allies and only one percent by Japan.¹ As Figure 10 shows, comparisons in 1987 remained unchanged. In 1987, as another example, Japan spent on \$17 billion on defense compared to the U.S.'s \$300 billion.² Even more grating was Japan's ambivalent attitude when approached about this and other issues such as trade.³ The U.S. was not only spending more of its wealth on defense than its allies, such trends had persisted for a very long time as Figure 11 illustrates.




Figure 11: Defense Expense Trends

Various comparisons emphasized this unequal burden to our allies. Comparisons generally focused on two types of measure. One measure compared economic indicators such as the ratio of defense expenses to GNP, increases of defense expenses per

year, defense expenses per capita, etc.⁶ Another measure compared military indicators such as the number of defense personnel, ground forces, naval forces, air forces, strategic nuclear forces, airlift forces and sea lift forces.⁷ Some analyses tempered the results to show effects of budget deficits, trade imbalances and trade in defense products.⁸ Disputes

commonly arose. Different allies imputed different costs in their baseline; others, such as Japan, excluded certain costs such as retirement benefits. There were disagreements about how to incorporate 'opportunity costs'--non assessed rents, exempted tolls and duties, etc--foreign aid, technology development and transfers, and conscription into calculations. Inevitably, whatever measure used, the conclusions were the same: the U.S. spent more than its fair share and our allies should do more.

Although the Carter Administration had originally surfaced the issue, it got few positive results. Primarily, efforts concentrated on increasing contributions by dictating expected spending levels by our allies. While this approach marginally worked with NATO, very little success resulted with Japan. The Reagan administration took a different approach. Efforts to increase contributions focused more on roles and missions. This approach was more successful--getting the Japanese to accept SLOC defense and limited air defense in the early 1980s. But, after eight years of further efforts by the Reagan Administration, Japan's defense spending remained too low to meet its own defense needs and especially too low considering the additional missions.⁹

Besides just the issue of defense spending, Japan's trade practices began to aggravate the political climate in Washington. Her practices not only gave unfair advantage in the market, they also continued to build up huge surpluses with her trading partners.¹⁰ When defense spending--largely financed by deficit

spending--was on the rise to meet a growing Soviet threat, huge trade deficits were almost politically intolerable.

The One Percent Issue

Japan's situation starkly contrasted to all other major allies. Despite U.S. pressures to do more, Japan expenditures never amounted to more than one percent of her GNP. Partly, this level resulted from the tremendous growth of Japan's GNP. One percent of an economy that was now the second largest in the world and growing at three to four percent a year yielded sizeable increases in defense spending--a five percent increase to defense expenditures per year. But, the U.S. felt that a fair share of GNP spent on defense efforts should be around three percent--roughly corresponding to the average of our NATO allies. Why wouldn't the Japanese willingly increase spending to a level more consistent with U.S. demands and in line with our other major allies?

Japan's inflexibility was perplexing. Japan refused to budge from a defense guideline that allocated only one percent of her GNP to defense. This guideline started in 1976. To the United States, this level seemed arbitrary and inconsistent with Japanese pledges to do more. Even during the tenure of Prime Minister Nakasone, one of the most outspoken Prime Ministers on Japan's defense roles, defense expenditures barely nudged above the one percent level--reaching 1.04 percent in September 1986.¹¹ Japan's recalcitrance and the U.S.'s insistence to spend more developed into heated debates within Congress and the defense

establishment. Legislation tried to tie expenditures to a fixed percentage increase in defense spending over previous years-- threatening withhold of funds and reductions in U.S. forces for non compliance. Eventually, Congress wrote into 1987 legislation that Japan should increase defense expenditures to three percent of her GNP. Most recently, after Japan still stuck to her usual one percent defense outlay, seemingly oblivious to Congressional pressures, demands shifted for Japan to pick up all the costs of U.S. forces in Japan.¹² Returning from a Congressional oversight trip, Congresswoman Schroeder had this perspective:

Unless Japan, Korea, and other Far Eastern Powers are prepared to help the U.S. in maintaining a military presence that benefits their security as well as ours, the U.S. will not be forward deployed here much longer. We simply cannot afford it.

During a visit to Japan in February 1990, echoing Schroeder's sentiments, Secretary of Defense Cheney stated the U.S. would look to moderate force adjustments and continued improvements in allied contribution to mutual security.¹⁴

Just to what extent does Japan share the costs of U.S. security forces in the Pacific? What does one percent of Japan's GNP provide? Slanted media reporting and negatively phrased statements by many public officials may discount Japan's true defense efforts to the American public. The next section examines Japanese defense efforts.

Japan's Self Defense Efforts: How Much is Enough?

The first misconception to discard is that Japan has only begun to share the burden of defense efforts because of

increasing U.S. pressure. This is the perception many Americans have. It is a wrong one. Japan shares the costs of U.S. efforts by a separate agreement established concurrently with the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in 1960. Recalling from Chapter Three, Article VI of the Security Treaty granted the U.S. use of Japanese facilities and areas needed for Japan's defense and those needed to maintain international peace and security in the Far East. More specifically, a separate Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) pursuant to Article VI established fiscal responsibilities for both countries. Japan furnishes facilities, areas and rights of way without cost to the United States. In 1981, this support amounted to \$182 million in cash outlays and another \$289 million in "opportunity costs"--those costs associated with exempted tolls and duties and non-assessed rents.¹⁵ By 1987, this figure had increased to \$346 million for cash outlays and \$654 million for "opportunity costs."¹⁶ Nor are these the only costs born by Japan.

The testimony of Mr. Joseph E. Kelley of the General Accounting Office to the Defense Burdensharing Panel provides an insightful and revealing documentary of U.S-Japan burdensharing initiatives since 1977. From his perspective, Japan has been more cooperative toward U.S. demands than generally acknowledged. To summarize from his statement:

- The U.S. held cost-sharing discussions with Japan in 1977 because of the falling value of the dollar. Japan agreed to assume several categories of yen-based labor

costs. In 1979, Japan signed a second agreement accepting more categories of yen-based costs. Japan regarded both agreements as within the provisions of the SOFA.

- In 1979, Japan agreed to initiate a Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) to fund quality-of-life new construction on U.S. bases such as family housing. Japan agreed to the FIP because their political climate was not favorable to increases of yen-based costs. The FIP budget started at \$100 million in 1979 and increased to \$560 million by 1987. In contrast, the U.S. spent only \$13 million for military construction in Japan in 1979 and \$37 million in 1987.
- The U.S. unsuccessfully pressed Japan for further increases in yen-based costs in 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1984. Japan felt further increases to be beyond the provisions of the SOFA.
- In 1987 Japan signed a new labor agreement for yen-based costs after urging from the U.S. because of rapid decreases in the dollar in 1986. Under this agreement, Japan assumed up to 50 percent of the costs of additional allowances over a five year period. Because Japan regarded this agreement as beyond the SOFA, it had to be approved by the Diet.
- In 1987, Japan pledged more assistance for U.S. forces in Japan instead of sending military forces and

equipment to the Persian Gulf to keep the oil SLOCs open. The U.S. used this opportunity to ask Japan to assume all yen-based costs such as labor, utilities and ship repairs. Japan countered this request with an offer to amend the 1987 agreement to assume up to 100 percent of allowances by 1990. With this agreement, Japan's labor costs increased from \$31 million in 1978 to \$260 million in 1987. When this agreement is fully implemented, Japan will pay 53 percent of the costs to station U.S. troops in Japan.

- Despite U.S. urging to spend more than one percent of GNP on defense forces, Japan has steadfastly declined. Yet, this spending limit has still managed to translate into a five percent average increase in defense spending per year.
- Japan has also undertaken additional contributions at urging from the United States. For example, in 1981, Japan increased foreign economic aid to Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, South Korea and Oman at the request of the United States. Japan's foreign aid budget increased from \$1.6 billion in 1980 to \$4.7 billion in 1987. In 1983, Japan acquiesced to U.S. requests to reciprocate on military technology transfers--an exception to Japan's policy of not transferring military technology to foreign countries. In 1985, Japan agreed to participate in the research and development of the

Strategic Defense Initiative. In 1987 under U.S. pressure, Japan agreed to use the U.S. made F-16 fighter aircraft as the baseline for a future fighter. Japan, at the U.S.'s request, also provided an additional \$500 million in monetary support of Jordan and Oman during the 1987 Persian Gulf Crisis and furnished \$17 million in precision navigation equipment to Persian Gulf countries.¹⁷

The point to take from this discourse is the U.S. has extensively asked for Japan to do more. For the most part, Japan has complied. So much so, that from the Japanese perspective, U.S. demands never seem to cease.

"How much is enough?" was the question. Right now, Japan's spending limit of one percent GNP for defense efforts translates into a \$40 billion per year defense budget--making Japan's the third largest defense budget in the world.¹⁸ Japan's defense budget exceeds all East Asian countries combined.¹⁹ In terms of forces, Japan will soon have three times as many destroyer type surface ships and four times more P-3 anti-submarine warfare aircraft than the entire U.S. Seventh Fleet.²⁰ Japan has more tactical aircraft than deployed by the U.S. to Japan, Korea and the Philippines combined.²¹ Japan's 100 F-4 aircraft and soon 200 F-15 aircraft match the 300 or so fighter aircraft maintained for the defense of the entire United States.²² Paraphrasing one writer, what would Japan spend three percent of her GNP for when something less than half of that will do?²³

THE CHANGING POLITICAL CLIMATE

Japanese Domestic Shifts

Besides being unsuccessful, the U.S.'s incessant demands led to hard feelings in Japan and perceptions of challenges to national sovereignty.¹⁴ Just like the debates in Congress, debates emerged as well in Japan about the extent of future burdensharing efforts and continued dependence upon the U.S. to provide national security. This contrasted sharply with the overall favorable support for the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance held throughout the 1970s.¹⁵ For example, a 1989 Harris poll found 52 percent of Japanese respondents felt Japan should rely less on the U.S. for national defense in the future.¹⁶ In the same poll, only 31 percent of Japanese respondents favored Japan continuing its military dependence on the United States. Increasingly, the Japanese question the presence of U.S. troops. The Harris poll reflected 68 percent of Japanese favored reducing or eliminating U.S. military presence.¹⁷ The spring edition of Foreign Policy carried a story by Japanese journalist Kan Ito who stated "the American policy of keeping Japan militarily weak while pressuring Japan to pay more has built up suppressed anger and resentment among many Japanese politicians and bureaucrats . . . it will eventually invite an unhealthy nationalistic backlash."¹⁸ Shintaro Ishara, co-author of The Japan That Can Say No, a book stirring discussions in Washington, recently commented, "Japan has been criticized by Americans for taking a 'free ride' on U.S. military power, but it was the United States,

after all, that refused Japan the chance to shoulder its due share of the burden by developing a defense system suitable to its need."²⁹

Not only is public opinion perhaps swinging away from alliance support, the conflicting messages sent to Japan cloud the real issues. There is some confusion about expectations. While on one hand, the U.S. seems to want Japan to increase defense spending, is it to such an extent that Japan's security dependence on the U.S. mostly diminishes?³⁰ Or is the object to use Japan's defense efforts as a cure to the U.S.'s twin deficit problems, and as a result, risk Japan's military buildup becoming a threat to regional stability?³¹ Ironically, while the U.S. keeps harping on Japan to spend more, many of Japan's neighbors want defense expenditures to decline.³²

While none of these reports are particularly threatening to continuing the alliance, they show a swing in Japanese public opinion. The U.S.'s role in providing Japanese security remains a decisive one, but there is growing acceptance of a more independent and a more assertive role for Japanese military forces.³³ Despite Japanese consciousness of her neighbors suspicions and despite internal pacifism, there is a perceptible awareness and willingness to increase defense roles and military capability.³⁴ This aspiring willingness, coupled with a rising sentiment that the U.S. has been pushing Japan around for too long, could spell discordant times ahead.³⁵ As one author noted, each new American demand causes the U.S. to be seen as an

unreasonable bully whose leadership and trust is not reliable.³⁶ This author goes on to report that Japan's deference to U.S. leadership is increasingly being questioned by a younger generation who neither remembers WW II nor feels any debt to the United States. Further, he reports, growing numbers of nationalists advocate a more independent stance by Japan, a buildup of the military and a reassertion of Japan's traditional dominance of Asia. Increasingly, these nationalistic sentiments may shift Japan's focus away from communism toward anti-Americanism.³⁷ Certainly, these reactions must be viewed cautiously. But, perennial demands from Washington on trade and defense issues can only increase disharmony if presented in the American characteristic "Japan bashing" style.

The most troublesome outcome from a growing shift in public opinion for a more autonomous Japan may yet come. As the last chapter highlighted, as perceptions of the Soviet threat abate, the pressure for more burdensharing by our allies--especially the economically strong ones like Japan--will continue. From the Japanese perspective, if indeed the Soviet threat has abated, U.S. demands for more burdensharing will only aggravate growing anti-burdensharing sentiments. The relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union is critical to determine the political prospects for continuing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

The Soviet-Japan Relationship

Traditionally, the Soviet-Japan relationship has been cool. While part of this coolness stems from an earlier war in the

early 1900s. Soviet actions after WW II provided sustaining justification. The Soviets conscripted more than 570,000 Japanese prisoners of war as slave laborers in Siberia in the late 1940's, violating international law and costing many Japanese lives.³⁸ The Soviets seized the Kurile Islands, four craggy, northern islands northeast of Hokkaido, as spoils of war.³⁹ Japan claims historical ownership--a point so strongly felt by the Japanese they refused to sign the Peace Treaty with the Soviets to end WW II in 1951.⁴⁰ Soviet adventurism since 1978 has further solidified Japan's perception of the Soviets as a military threat.

Now, warming of U.S.-Soviet relations also could change Japan's traditional view of the Soviets. As the U.S. and West Europe continue to improve relations with the Soviets, Japan is acutely aware that they are the only nation maintaining a hard line.⁴¹ As the Soviets decrease the size of their military forces in the Far East, and even if they don't, Japanese support for defense spending may be equally as hard to justify in Japan as it is in the United States. Decreases in U.S. defense budgets, a de facto acknowledgement of a reduced threat, are not lost on the Japanese. Neither is Gorbachev's charm. The Soviets need Japanese technology and investments even more so than the Japanese need more sources of raw materials.⁴² Some believe the Soviets want to court Japan because they see Japan's centralized society as an alternative to the forces of free-market capitalism.⁴³

Notes one author, "The shock of a Japanese-Soviet rapprochement could be as dramatic and profound as that of the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 1971."⁴⁴ A key event will occur when Gorbachev visits Japan in April 1991. Japan has almost flatly refused to consider aid and warmer relationships with the Soviets until the territorial issue is resolved.⁴⁵ The Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Lyudvig Chizhov stated, both countries remain wide apart, but the Soviet Union hopes to establish trust between the two countries and to promote talks to conclude a bilateral peace treaty.⁴⁶ Expect this issue to be a main topic for discussion during Gorbachev's visit.⁴⁷ If the Soviets meet Japan's demands for return of the islands or even advance an acceptable starting point, Japan may be forced to redefine her political position. A modified position would have to readdress the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance since it is largely counters a Soviet threat.

The combination of rising anti-burdensharing sentiments and the removal of the principal threat may force a political reevaluation of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. Japan's support of activities in the Persian Gulf may taint an objective analysis.

JAPAN'S PERSIAN GULF SUPPORT

There is no event that will ultimately define U.S. and Japan defense relationships more than the current Persian Gulf crisis. Before the crisis was even over, the U.S. sharply criticized Japan's efforts more than once. And, Japan has its share of American critics as well. As one author noted, "the resolution

of the Gulf crisis will be a harbinger for the future of alliances that sustained the United States through the Cold War.⁴³ What is at stake? At least three issues surface. For one thing, the entire issue of bilateral defense alliances could come under review. For another, the concept of equity in burdensharing becomes an issue--can mere money offset the social and emotional costs of forces on the line? Yet a third is the level of acceptable participation in the U.N. as a peacekeeping body. Japanese actions and motives will be under intense scrutiny by American and world opinion.

Congressman Dorgan's [North Dakota] demand before the House of Representatives on January 23, 1991 captures rising sentiments:

While America risks its young lives and its treasury, Japan and Germany and some other allies are sitting this one out. They are spectators on the sidelines, leading the cheers. So we borrow money from Japan and Germany so that we can defend an oil supply that is much more important to them than it is to us . . . Mr. Speaker, it is time for this country to demand that Japan and Germany and those few other allies who are behind us-way behind us-start standing with us . . . it is time for America to demand-yes-demand that Japan and Germany, and others help bear the fair share of the burden and help carry the load.⁴⁴

Japan's actions in the Persian Gulf illustrate the interactions of many issues discussed throughout this paper. For example, Japan's pre-occupation with economic interests surface. Political indecisiveness--noted in Chapter Two--is rampant throughout this case study. Japan--often characterized as forming foreign policy in response to American pressures--is again caught between U.S. demands and domestic resistance. Extolling constitutional pacifism, casting an economic eye for to

future and conscious that she must do something in the international arena, Japan flounders trying to reach consensus about what to do without looking like she is doing exactly what the U.S. orders. A chronological listing of selected newspaper headlines illustrates Japan's quandary.

Actions Before the Crisis

In events just before the Persian Gulf, Japan resumed financial aid to communist China despite the stance other major economic powers took in the aftermath of the Tianamen Square incident. Counter to the moderate stance of the United States, Japan rationalized it was better to keep China engaged in world affairs than risk a return inward. Japan also stood firm at the Uruguay GATT rounds against the U.S. and Germany--surprising most participants by such uncharacteristic behavior. Some analysts speculated Japan

- "Japan's Rising Self-Confidence Leads to Increased Assertiveness at Summit"
- "Japan Follows U.S., Cuts Trade With Iraq"
- "Japanese Are Split on Stance Toward Iraq and Seeking Other Oil Supplies"
- "Japan Considers a Role in Gulf Force"
- "Japan Offering Billions to Arabs to Help Offset Gulf Crisis Losses"
- "Japan Restricted in Ways to Help, Will Send Medical Aid to Middle East"
- "Where's the New Superpower?"
- "Japan Promises Grants and Food, but Lack of Arms Aid Baffles U.S."
- "Kaifu Mulls Options"
- "Oil Shortage to Challenge Japan's Policy"
- "Japan, Not Knowing How to Act, Isn't Sure It Wants To"
- "SDP Members Happy at Home"
- "Mideast Aid Policy Attracts Criticism"
- "Japan Wakes From a Dream"
- "Kaifu: Send People to Gulf"
- "Japan to Look for Ways to Deploy Noncombatant Personnel to Gulf"
- "Nation Ups the Ante: \$4 Billion in Gulf Aid"
- "Japan's Past Weighs"
- "Should SDP Go To Gulf?"
- "Japanese Fears of Militarism Fuels Opposition"
- "Why the Japanese Find It So Difficult to Unsheathe Swords"
- "Some Fear Bill Sets a Risky Precedent"
- "Is Japan Out of Step?"
- "What Japan's Checkbook Diplomacy Isn't Buying"
- "Why Militarism Still Haunts Japan"

might start to actively participate--befitting her economic stature--and not just follow in the world economic order.⁵⁰

Initial Speculation

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, most felt the oil interruptions would starve Japan just like the oil shocks of the 1970s did. Believing this situation, there was apprehension that Japan may not subscribe to U.N. resolutions condemning this aggression and seek an independent course of action. Such fears were not unfounded because of Japanese actions in 1973 and in 1979. In the first case, Japan's support of U.S. policies in the Middle East shifted when Saudi Oil Minister Amed Zaki Yamani issued Japan an ultimatum that said, "If you are hostile (i.e., continue to recognize Israel) to us, you get no oil. If you are neutral, you get oil but not as much as before. If you are friendly (i.e., support Arab diplomatic/economic sanctions against Israel) you get the same oil as before."⁵¹ In the second case in 1979, Japan resumed oil purchases from Iran, changing from an earlier position of support for the U.S.'s embargo of Iranian oil due to the Hostage Crisis and in spite of U.S. pressures to continue the embargo.⁵² Even more recently, as previous discussions on burdensharing highlighted, Japan gave money and donated navigation equipment instead of minesweepers to secure the Persian Gulf SLOCs in 1987. Complicating the current crisis, Iraq owed about \$5 billion to Japan. However, Japan was in a much better position in 1990 to ride out oil interruptions. Only 12 percent of Japan's oil comes from Iraq and Kuwait.⁵³

Because of her efforts to diversify sources of supply and to stockpile, Japan had 142 days oil reserve.⁵⁴

Initial Support Through August

When the U.S. announced military support to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Japan initially declined to support U.S. actions.⁵⁵ On August 17, Japan announced sending non military support personnel to back the U.S. was under consideration.⁵⁶ Support considered ranged from transportation and communications experts to medical personnel or minesweepers.⁵⁷ Japanese public opinion was already lining up against such actions citing Article IX of the constitution.⁵⁸ By August 23, Prime Minister Kaifu, previously scheduled for a visit to the Mid East, abruptly canceled his trip largely because his advisors could not agree how to best promote Japanese interests in the region.⁵⁹ When most nations had already decided to stand against Iraq and the U.N. had already released some major resolutions, Japan's actions were seen as a blow to her earlier asserted diplomatic efforts.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, at urging from President Bush, Japan offered aid to those countries supporting the embargo against Iraq.⁶¹ At this point, President Bush additionally urged Japan to increase her share of the costs to station troops in Japan.⁶² Japan played down her financial assistance to keep her efforts from being labelled as "checkbook diplomacy."⁶³ Prime Minister Kaifu reaffirmed his pledge of non military support in the way of 100-200 medical support personnel as a first step in a comprehensive response.⁶⁴ One author noted, "In a military crisis, what role is there for a country with a

powerful economy and a pacifist constitution?"⁶² By now, at the end of August, with very little firm resolve shown by Japan, headlines were now asking "Where's the New Superpower?"⁶³

On August 30, Japan unveiled her program to help finance the international efforts against Iraq.⁶⁴ Immediately, the proposal was under fire from Washington because it lacked any direct, tangible aid to the military buildup.⁶⁵ Ambassador Michael H. Armacost relayed to Japanese editorial writers that Americans felt "impatience, bewilderment, and exasperation" with Japan's delays in announcing intentions; he called for Japan to send minesweepers and ships for transport.⁶⁶ Kaifu "appealed to Japanese to abandon their aloof approach to world political crises."⁶⁷ He went on to say, "If Japan's response is delayed and the world gets the impression that Japan does nothing for peace in the region, when its own important national interest is at stake, Japan's future will be lost."⁶⁸

Japan's response to the building crisis is symptomatic of the diffused power of the Prime Minister, the emotionalism inspired by Article IX of the constitution and a general isolation from world affairs over the last 40 years. Increasingly "bureaucratic rivalries, political infighting, and a long-standing ambivalence towards a larger role on the world stage" hamper Tokyo's reactions.⁶⁹ These events also illustrate one of Japan's dilemma's: sensitivity toward American pressure and a desire to keep her prerogatives open.⁷⁰ Reportedly, after a personal request from President Bush and in response to mounting American

criticism, Japan pledged \$1 billion in gulf aid.⁷¹ While the U.S. tried to persuade Japan that the transport of military equipment and personnel was not a violation of the constitution, owners and unionized workers of airlines and shipping companies refused to be swayed.⁷² Meanwhile, the government considered options for response. Options included

- ✓ mine sweepers;
- ✓ medical, transport, communications and other non combatant support;
- ✓ pay for U.S. chartered planes for multinationals;
- ✓ providing emergency relief to debt ridden nations such as Turkey, Egypt and Jordan;
- ✓ technical assistance;
- ✓ financial assistance to the U.N.; and
- ✓ emergency economic aid for East European nations hit by oil interruptions.⁷³

Not everyone in Japan was reluctant to deploy to the gulf. Many in the Self Defense Force (SDF) were irritated and upset by the government's inability to come to grips with the situation--especially by the government's tactics to skirt the issue to avoid public debate.⁷⁴ As one SDF member put it, "We can't be full members of the free world society if we do not shed blood to protect world security...Japan can't excuse itself from hard work just by making financial contributions."⁷⁵

Support Still Largely Undefined in September

When September rolled around, Japan still had not defined the extent of her support for gulf efforts. Although unable to get the airlines to support gulf efforts, the major auto makers agreed in principle to let the government use their ships to transport military vehicles and equipment--excluding weapons and ammunition--from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia.⁷⁶ This crisis marks the change of what the world--and maybe the U.S. specifically--expects of Japan. In the Cold War, all Japan had to do was to cooperate with the U.S. to maintain a defensive stance against the Soviets.⁷⁷ Now, suddenly, the world looked to Japan for action.⁷⁸ Such action was not easily forthcoming. By the middle of September, the inability of Japan to decipher just what was expected became obvious. One headline read, "Japan, Not Knowing How to Act, Isn't Sure it Wants To."⁷⁹ Japan's response to this identity crisis was to increase pledges of aid from \$1 billion to \$2 billion in economic assistance to multinational forces in Saudi Arabia coupled with \$2 billion more in long-term loans to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey.⁸⁰ This indecisiveness again typifies the weakness of the Prime Minister in forcing a decision between a divided party and bureaucrats.⁸¹ Meanwhile, opinions started to divide among the SDF with many now expressing thoughts that they should not deploy.⁸²

Proposals for a Peace Cooperation Corps

By now, Prime Minister Kaifu decided to feel out political support from his party. He announced his intentions to send

people to the gulf. He stated, "In the days when Japan was still in the process of rebuilding its war-battered economy, financial contributions alone may have been enough. But now Japan is one of the leading industrialized democracies and must fulfill its international responsibilities."⁸³ His call for deploying personnel attempted to go around the Article IX issue by citing Article 98; he declared this article allows Japan to honor international laws and, therefore, takes precedence over Article IX.⁸⁴ Kaifu called his proposal a U.N. Peace Cooperation Corps--trying to avoid the Article IX issue.⁸⁵

Meanwhile, Japan dispatched part of a 100 person medical team and sent two flights to Amman, Jordan.⁸⁶ Such actions and declaratory intentions prompted heated discussions. Discussions centered on whether SDF members should be included in this Peace Cooperation Corps.⁸⁷ On September 27, the Prime Minister officially unveiled his proposal.⁸⁸ Partly, his proposal aimed at countering growing criticism of Japan for being indecisive and not contributing enough to gulf efforts.⁸⁹ Additionally, the proposal was meant to bolster Kaifu's sagging domestic and international reputation.⁹⁰

While the Peace Cooperation Corps was under fierce debate internally, Japan came under increasing pressure from abroad--some criticizing her lack of response, some urging her to exert a global role and some expressing concern of remilitarization. An Indonesian diplomat called Japan's anxiety over the SDF deployment exaggerated and self-serving.⁹¹ Australia's Prime

Minister, Bob Hawke, invited Japan to assume superpower status and reenter the world by taking an active military role.⁹² China's General Secretary of the Communist Party, Jiang Zemin, expressed concern to a visiting Japanese diplomat about using SDF forces abroad.⁹³ South Korea cautioned that military involvement in the gulf would be "seen as a deeply worrisome shift in Japanese policy."⁹⁴ Some other Asian countries also related their uneasiness about Japanese military involvement in the gulf.⁹⁵

Kaifu's proposal met rough times in the Diet and in domestic public opinion. Pushed by President Bush, Kaifu related that Japan's status as a world economic superpower leaves it no choice but to take an active role in world politics.⁹⁶ Yet, public opposition showed intense disagreement with margins between two to one to four to one against sending personnel to the Middle East.⁹⁷ Despite obvious lack of support, the proposal went to the Diet on October 16.⁹⁸ Trying to bolster support, the government argued that troops used in collective defense arrangements did not violate the constitution because guaranteeing collective security was different from entering into collective defensive arrangements.⁹⁹ Domestic opinion, however showed very little support--48.5 percent opposed dispatch of SDF troops under any conditions and only 23.1 percent supported the idea of the Peace Cooperation Corps at all.¹⁰⁰

By November 4, the government got a rude awakening about just how seriously the electorate viewed Article IX restrictions and their distrust of the government.¹⁰¹ People took to the streets

effectively killing any chance for authorizing legislation to deploy personnel to the gulf.¹⁰² According to one author, many Japanese see Article IX as a "vital restraint against a government and a military that has yet to win their trust."¹⁰³ Polls show most Japanese view any overseas mission as a potentially disastrous precedent.¹⁰⁴ By November 7, despite many revisions, Kaifu reservedly withdrew the bill from the Diet when defeat seemed almost certain.¹⁰⁵

The Interlude

While debate continued in Japan and the situation continued to deteriorate in the gulf, Japan was still wrestling about how best to respond. Most still hoped for a peaceful resolution; some argued that U.S. was not giving Iraq a chance to negotiate. American legislators and officials expressed concern over the extent of Japan's contributions to the gulf efforts. In a news release, Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, gave Japan a "C" for her efforts saying that Japan wasn't doing anywhere near her fair share of the burden in the gulf.¹⁰⁶ He went on to say, "Other nations should know they are being judged by the American public and commonly found wanting."¹⁰⁷ More pointedly, he said:

While the world is busily debating whether the soft Americans will sustain a confrontation when faced with any substantial casualties, the world ought also to consider the attitude of the American public should a war erupt in which the casualties are overwhelmingly American. If Americans are critical today of the relative unwillingness of others--chiefly Europeans and Japanese--to share the burden of this confrontation, imagine how critical--even furious--they are likely to

be when they see few others paying the bloodprice. One should demand that the Congress and the Administration impose a heavy penalty on non-participants.¹⁰⁹

More rhetoric appeared and demanded Japan do more. Senior U.S. officials told a mission from the Japanese Defense Agency that "physical support" as well as financial support was expected.¹⁰⁹ Not only was the mission told that financial assistance alone was insufficient, but they were advised burdensharing arrangements would be reviewed because of Japan's economic power.¹¹⁰

With war appearing more evident as the January 16, 1991 deadline drew closer, on January 15, Japan and the U.S. signed a new Host Nation Support (HNS) agreement by which Japan would pay almost half of all costs to station U.S. troops in Japan by the end of 1995--up from 40 percent.¹¹¹ Under this new agreement, Japan assumed all labor and utility costs presently paid by the United States.¹¹² Japan also announced \$38 million in additional funding for refugee relief, if needed, and creation of a 50 billion yen endowment to further the U.S.-Japan global partnership.¹¹³ Both Secretary Baker and the visiting Japanese Foreign Minister reaffirmed that the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance remains the foundation of the two nations relationship, is welcomed and needed in the region and will continue to guarantee peace and stability throughout the region even in the post-cold war period.¹¹⁴ Ironically, while Secretary Baker expressed appreciation for Japan's political and financial support in the gulf, other U.S. legislators and officials were publicly critical of Japan's efforts.¹¹⁵

War Breaks Out

War broke out on January 16, 1991 between the forces of the multinational coalition--led by the U.S.--and Iraq. Japan was told of the opening hostilities about 30 minutes before the actual start.¹¹⁵ On January 18, Japan announced intentions to pledge upwards of an additional \$5 billion in financial aid and additional material assistance, raising her total contributions to \$7 billion in assistance to the multinational forces and \$2 billion in aid to front line countries.¹¹⁷ Strangely enough, in another report, Japan hinted at sending Self-Defense Force C-130 transport planes to the gulf to help evacuate refugees--creating another situation where opposition forces immediately reacted.¹¹⁸ Prime Minister Kaifu responded to questions from the opposition by saying, "The dispatch of the SDF to the Middle East is not meant as Japan's participation in the Gulf War because the United Nations has repeatedly requested Japan to provide airplanes for the United Nations on humanitarian grounds to rescue refugees in the region."¹¹⁹

In subsequent reports about the SDF transports, the government explained that this action--an emergency drill--did not violate the constitution because the SDF law allows SDF craft and personnel to be used for drills, disaster relief and for scientific research in Antarctica.¹²⁰ Several other rationalizations to permit the deployment of transports and SDF personnel would evolve over the next several days.

By January 21, reports broke that Japan may provide up to \$10 billion in financial assistance to support the U.S.-led multinational forces and front-line countries.¹²¹ On January 22, 1991, Japanese government sources related the U.S. requested Japan shoulder 20 percent of the war's cost--estimated to be \$500 million per day.¹²² An announcement of an additional \$9 billion in financial assistance for U.S.-led multinational forces was scheduled for release on January 23, but did not actually occur until January 24.¹²³ When announced, the package included not only an additional \$9 billion, but also an additional \$1 billion in aid to front-line countries.¹²⁴ Japan also stated, although not specifically asked by the multinational forces, it would not provide Patriot air defense missiles to the coalition as supplies decreased.¹²⁵

In regards to the SDF transports, the government was now citing another article in the SDF law which allowed the planes to transport whatever is determined by the relevant government regulation.¹²⁶ To head off opposition, the government announced it would present the SDF issue to the National Security Council and the Cabinet.¹²⁷ The government and the LDP stated that both the financial pledges and the SDF transports were responding to international criticism for inadequate contributions and lack of physical support.¹²⁸ The opposition under the leadership of Japan Socialist Party (JSP) Chairwoman Doi accused the government of "unconditionally meeting the U.S. Government's demands and forfeiting its own sovereign rights."¹²⁹ Doi went on to criticize

the government for avoiding debates within the Diet on deployment of the SDF transports to the gulf.¹³⁰ By January 31, the government announced its plan to allow the SDF members to carry small arms while deployed to the gulf.¹³¹

By February 4, not only did debate embroil the issue of the SDF mission, the circumstances of the additional financial assistance were also under fire. There was debate whether the same restrictions for non lethal use applied to the \$9 billion as it did for the earlier pledges.¹³² Additionally, the Prime Minister had to defend the government's actions. He said the additional aid was by Japan's own initiative as the world's second largest economic power and not because of the benefits it receives from Persian Gulf oil.¹³³ Other LDP officials attempted to introduce new debates within the Diet about more roles for the SDF in the gulf and in the world in general, but these issues were now rejected as premature by the Prime Minister.¹³⁴ Meanwhile, opposition to deployment of the SDF continued with private citizens raising enough money to charter at least one civilian plane to show to the world that Japan could provide humanitarian aid without deploying the SDF.¹³⁵ In response to continuing opposition in the Diet over the SDF transports, the government now declared deployment authorized under an article of the SDF law that allows the government to transport state guests or other designated persons.¹³⁶

In more debates, Kaifu's government came under attack for its earlier medical support of gulf efforts.¹³⁷ Specifically, the

opposition pointed out that only 17 doctors actually went to the gulf when at least 100 were promised. Furthermore, the Saudi's and Japan could not agree on how long the doctors would stay and on what they would do. Consequently, the medical team had since returned home. As a final embarrassing fact, only 8 of 20 promised ambulances had ever left the parking lot to Saudi Arabia because the other 12 were right hand drive vehicles.

On February 13, Japan modified her earlier position about the non lethal uses of the \$9 billion by stating the funds could be used for transport of military personnel, weapons and ammunition.¹³⁸ Additional hints of more aid started to appear as well.

The Aftermath

As this account shows, Japan's experience throughout this crisis has been one of turmoil. As stated earlier, this crisis marks the change of what the world--and maybe the U.S. specifically--expects of Japan. In the Cold War, all Japan needed to do was cooperate with the U.S. to maintain a defensive stance against the Soviets. Now, suddenly, the world looked to Japan for action. Such action was limited and slow forthcoming. Even her efforts at financial support, let alone physical support, generated heated debates internally as well as frustration and bewilderment internationally.

More importantly, the crisis will continue to generate debate in both countries about burdensharing and roles in the global

community. Debates cannot fail to reexamine the political benefits and costs derived from the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

THE POLITICAL PROSPECTS FOR THE ALLIANCE

Obviously, the political dimensions of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance must be favorable for it to continue. American demands for increased burdensharing before and during the Persian Gulf crisis had become an irritating friction to many Japanese. Also, Americans have misconceptions about the extent of Japanese efforts. Bashing on both sides aggravate and distort facts. There are many who argue the alliance has lost its reason for being since the end of the Cold War removed the basis of the alliance. While a military threat capability still exists, the intention to use this capability appears waning. Not only is intention questioned, but Soviet announcements to strengthen bilateral relations with Japan might alone spell the end of the political basis for continuing the alliance. The upcoming visit to Japan by President Gorbachev will be a critical event.

More critical may be the judgement of American and Japanese people about the Persian Gulf. On one hand, many Americans are dissatisfied with Japan's inability to contribute positively to Gulf efforts beyond financial efforts. Japan's financial efforts in the end could result in even more calls for burdensharing by the United States--who irked by an absence of physical commitment, may solicit even more contributions as a form of retribution. On the other hand, American demands for actual physical contributions could also weaken Japanese support in the

future for the alliance. Fears exist in Japan about becoming embroiled in a conflict because of U.S. actions and, thus, being forced to sacrifice deeply felt pacifist sentiments.

Yet in fairness, one has to admire just how far the Japanese have come in taking on any responsible world role at all. The real issue for Japan is deciphering just what the world really expects. Is it just financial support? Is it just political support? Is it physical support? Does the world truly want an international Japan capable of providing all three elements? No one can help Japan develop these roles better than the United States.

Has the alliance outlived its political usefulness? A candid answer is both nations need the alliance from a political perspective.

From a U.S. viewpoint, the cost advantages of the alliance are the best ever--the U.S. cannot forward deploy troops or maintain a forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region for less. An additional advantage, the alliance keeps us engaged in the Pacific, something all Pacific nations seem to want. Even China and the Soviets have stated they welcome our presence as a stabilizing influence.

From the Japanese perspective, the alliance still provides a framework to sort out just what forms of contribution to make to the world order. Not only does the alliance give Japan a framework to develop within, it also provides insulation from the suspicions and fears of neighbors who somehow cannot forget the

past. As long as Japan's national security strategy develops within the rubric of the alliance, she can participate within the Asian region in economic harmony without her military motives under constant scrutiny. This reason alone make the political advantages of the alliance well worth the small concessionary costs.

Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki, in a Plenary Address to the 1989 Pacific Symposium, related a story of alliances that provides insight for today's situation. A paraphrase of his story goes like this:

In the first 20 years of this century, Japan maintained an alliance with Britain. Just as the U.S. is the hegemonic power today, so it was then with Britain. The Japanese felt their security was safeguarded in an alliance with such a world power. Being an island nation, Japan felt even more comfortable in an alliance with the nation that ruled the oceans.

When people feel comfortable in their security, naturally they seek freedom and liberty and concentrate on economic achievement. During this alliance, Japan made great progress in democracy. When the alliance ended in 1921, people felt insecure when they had to defend Japan's security by themselves. Japan's lifeline--then Korea--became Manchuria. Pre-occupation with security began to aggravate tensions with neighbors. Ultimately, WW II resulted.

What was the real tragedy? Why did the alliance end? Partly competition between the U.S. and Canada for Britain's favor. But the fundamental reason was the U.S. sent its troops to the European front in 1917 and Japan did not. Japan considered India as the western limit of her defense commitment to Britain--a logical but unfortunate political decision mainly based upon illusions of independent diplomacy.

Wouldn't it be tragic if history repeated itself when it comes to the value of maintaining the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance?

How can the United States and Japan avoid the rising frictions at the periphery of the Security Alliance? The last chapter offers some perspectives.

CHAPTER FIVE KEEPING THE ALLIANCE ALIVE

This paper argues the Security Alliance--though undergoing some stiff political challenges in the New World Order--has a future. While a large of this paper focused on the military and the political dimensions of the Security Alliance, one should also focus on the actual alliance itself as the strongest argument for the alliance to continue. The preamble perhaps lays out the most enduring reasons why the Security Alliance should continue (emphasis added):

The United States of America and Japan,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and the principles if the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security, . . .

Obviously, there is more than just security issues within the framework of the Security Alliance. Political leaders of both nations should probably refresh themselves with the text of the Security Alliance and recognize that fundamental nati nal values have not changed in the last 30 years. In fact what is

articulated in this preamble is not much different than those values and interests articulated in the President's National Security Policy. It's not just security issues that underwrite the alliance; it's also issues of political stability, democracy, human rights, economic prosperity and economic stability as well. The words of the alliance itself provide the most enduring reasons for the alliance's future.

The third objective of this paper is to identify roles for the U.S. to encourage and Japan to undertake in the evolving new world order.

This final chapter discusses several proposed roles. A rather long list of roles and expectations could be compiled from the views of both nations. Some items are presented in the accompanying graphic.

There are some Americans who might argue that the present terms of the U.S.-Japan relationship are entirely healthy. That is, the give and take on the

U.S. DEMANDS ON JAPAN

- Consume more
- Decrease domestic savings
- Increase deficit spending
- Increase U.S. imports
- Reduce exports to U.S.
- Accept U.S. capital
- Modernize distribution system
- Strengthen central government
- Change foreign aid structure
- Open markets
- Improve housing
- Improve public infrastructure
- Revise land policies
- End agricultural subsidies
- Increase military spending
- Share technology with U.S
- Deny technology to hostiles
- Bolster friendly regimes

JAPANESE DEMANDS ON U.S.

- Consume less
- Save more
- Decrease deficit spending
- Maintain Japanese imports
- Reduce exports to Japan
- Accept Japanese capital
- Improve education
- Use long-term planning
- Improve marketing skills
- Commercialize innovations
- Share technology
- Become more competitive?

various points of friction serve to keep the U.S. in a dominant position. The thoughts of a more outward going Japan and one that seeks more in the world forum beyond economic aggrandizement is not a welcome one. However, in my opinion such views are short-sighted and extremely self-serving. Keeping frictions intact might yield exactly the opposite results of keeping the U.S. in a superior position. That is, a constant source of friction becomes a rallying point for extremist positions in both nations. Therefore, it seems to me a common focus for both nations promotes the healthiest long-term results.

Thus, I see three fundamental roles for the architecture of the future in the U.S.-Japan relationship that extends out of the Security Alliance:

- becoming equal partners in a shared world vision.
- solving world problems and not each others.
- learning to live in a multi-polar world.

Let's examine these roles items in a little more detail.

BECOMING MORE EQUAL PARTNERS

The 1990's are not the 1960s. The U.S. is still a superpower but its power has been somewhat diluted over the last 30 years especially in the economic arena. Japan, likewise, has changed from a nation intent upon building a world class economy to one that has achieved it. Attitudes have changed as well. As one Japanese has put it, "Today, Japan is no longer the obedient follower of the United States. Japan cannot remain in that comfortable role even if it clearly wishes to do so . . . A

renewed commitment to this essential trans-Pacific friendship will demand new institutions and attitudes, not tinkering at the margins."³ The U.S. must recognize the times have changed as well as attitudes. The U.S. and Japan must approach their relationship maturely and objectively. Three areas for a more mature and objective--perhaps even a more equitable partnership--come to mind: security, technology and economic assistance.

In the area of security, focusing on burdensharing from the standpoint of roles and missions instead of funding seems to be a more sensible approach towards the real issue of security. This approach also fosters a feeling of more equitable roles in the security partnership. Jointly developing threat assessments as well as jointly formulating military strategy to counter threats furthers a more equal partnership. So far in the U.S.-Japan relationship, so many of the security issues have been strictly one sided.

Sharing technology represents a second area where more maturity and objectiveness could promote more equality in the U.S.-Japan partnership. Its becoming increasingly obvious that technology is vital to both economic and military superiority and competitiveness. Technology is also consuming a larger portion of a nations wealth--the U.S. proposed \$5 billion superconducting particle accelerator is one example. The stealth bomber at \$500-700 million each is another example. An even more revealing statistic, however, is the cost on a per scientist basis for large research facilities has grown from \$1-2 million to

approximately \$4-8 billion.⁴ The point is, due to increasing costs of technology and its relationship to economic and military superiority, greater cooperation between the U.S. and Japan in this area could substantially benefit both nations.

The efforts of the Japanese to develop an advanced fighter aircraft called the FSX illustrate how not to promote more equality in the relationship through the sharing of technology. The FSX was intended to replace an older aircraft in the inventory. While Japanese initiatives might have been applauded from the viewpoint of improving security obligations, these same efforts ended up largely denigrated by the United States out of mistrust, selfishness and just plain bullying.

In a nutshell, here's what happened.⁵ Obviously, Japanese industry as well as the defense sector were advocates for the FSX. However, U.S. industry rallied Congressional fears that the Japanese were trying to enter the commercial aviation market--one of the last bastions of American competitiveness and superiority. The U.S. persuaded Japan to upgrade the American F-16. This resulted in a coproduction agreement between General Dynamics and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries after a lot of haggling about production sites and shares. While hard feelings had developed on both sides during negotiations, these feelings were subsequently smoothed over. Then, shortly after the presidential elections in 1988, President Bush called for the agreement to be renegotiated. Renegotiations took place amidst growing Japanese sentiments that the U.S. did not trust Japan. The U.S. insisted

that advanced software needed for navigation and avionics be withheld from Japan while simultaneously insisting any Japanese technological improvements--especially in the area of composite materials--be provided back to the United States. To further rub salt in the wound, the final cost for a made over F-16--really a 1960s vintage airframe--will exceed \$64 million and probably be obsolete by the time the aircraft is fielded. The FSX deal represents an example of how not to cooperate, how not to build confidence between partners and how not to achieve more equitable negotiating positions.

Economic assistance represents a third area where more equality in the partnership could contribute to achieving a shared world vision. As Figure 12 shows, Japan has been one of

the world's largest donor of economic assistance to lesser developed countries. There are many in the U.S. who see Japanese foreign assistance as an offset for lack of defense spending. In fact, in earlier debates on burdensharing, some analysts argued economic assistance should be included




Figure 12: Economic Assistance

in measures of defense efforts. There is the feeling that the Japanese aid could compliment the U.S. military efforts around the world. Such arguments see this arrangements as preferable to

Japan increasing defense efforts. However, there are several points to consider. First, because Japan is the largest aid giver does not mean that Japan will commit aid per the direction of the United States. Secondly, much of the aid given by Japan is really just a means to improve or expand her export position since a lot of Japanese aid is tied to downstream economic purchases and developments. As a final point on the subject of aid, using a Japanese checkbook and American military might conjures up an image of this nation as a gun for hire. However, aid is one area that inarguably promotes world development and is generally welcomed around the world.

Solving World Problems

Constructive use of economic assistance could go a long way towards solving many of the world's problems. Developing a partnership in this area would certainly be more productive than concentrating solely on solving each others economic and security

problems. What are some of the areas? Education, medical research, developing alternative fuels and energy sources, environmental, hunger, agricultural research, population growth, homelessness and refugee

- | |
|-------------------------|
| Targets for Aid |
| o Education |
| o Medical |
| o Alternative Energy |
| o Environmental |
| o Hunger |
| o Agricultural Research |
| o Homelessness |
| o Orphans |
| o Refugee Assistance |

assistance all could benefit from a focused global effort. While some might argue these items are within the province of the

United Nations, there is room for all and certainly for a more coordinated push to let the United Nations do more.

Greater cooperation in world economic development goes along in this role as well. The interdependence of these two economies on the world is staggering. As already cited, the U.S. and Japanese economy constitute almost 40 percent of the world's total GNP. Japan is the U.S.'s second largest trading partner behind Canada. Japan is the second largest foreign investor in the United States. The point is, the economy of the U.S. and Japan are not only interdependent in their own rights, but because of the size of these economies, this interdependence takes on global proportions. Thus, economic issues--trade balances, market access, protectionism, etc--have ripple impacts across the globe. Therefore, these issues need to be resolved more in an international forum than just within the confines of bilateral discussions. Organizations such as GATT and perhaps the Australian proposed Asia Pacific Economic Community, APEC, provides a mechanism to solve world economic problems and not just focus on each other.

Greater political cooperation is another fruitful area. For example, one of the sad outcomes of the Persian Gulf is the U.S. and Japan have no joint political goals for the region. China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are areas where conflict has an almost equal chance to prosper as does economic political development. The point is, combining the wealth and expertise of the United States and Japan--be it in a evolutionary partnership

or just as greater supporters of international organizations--offers a unique opportunity for world impacts instead bilateral bickering.

The biggest obstacle to move toward a global role, however, might be the narrow view each nation has of its national security policy.

LEARNING TO LIVE IN A MULTI-POLAR WORLD

The Army War College teaches national power rests on political, economic and military capacity of a nation "to safeguard its national interests and to influence the behavior of other states."⁷ In the bipolar world following WW II, perceptions of national power became distorted--becoming synonymous with military power. Military power, specifically nuclear weapons capability, defined superpower stature and implied the ability to exert influence in the international arena to the relative exclusion of the political and economic elements.⁸ A similar distortion occurred with regard to the concept of national security policy. Academically, national security policy consists of five elements--foreign policy, defense policy, international economic policy, intelligence policy and domestic policy.⁹ In the Cold War, at least from a U.S. perspective, national security policy came to rest predominately on defense policy to the exclusion of the other elements.

As the Cold War matured, the military element of national power came to have a less credible influence in the international

arena. The New World Order forces a new look at the formulation of national security policy. Integration of all elements will be desirable if not mandated by changing world conditions. The economic element will assume an equal if not superior position relative to military power.

How does this relate to the issue of the U.S.-Japan relationships? What is striking about the United States and Japan relationship is each has a similar problem--the

elements of national power are not integrated into a national security strategy. The U.S.

The U.S. and Japan each has a similar problem--the elements of national power are not integrated into a national security policy

has predominately focused on the defense policy element with the foreign policy element in a supporting role and the other elements in diminutive roles. The Japanese, on the other hand, have predominately focused on the international economic element with their foreign policy largely being formed to further this element. Defense policy, domestic policy and intelligence policy elements were not only in diminutive roles relative to the other two, one could argue they were virtually non existent. Herein lies the challenge for the U.S. and Japan. Integration of the elements of national power to forge a national security policy must take place in both countries. Some hard questions must be formulated and answered. For example, what is it the U.S. wants from Japan and vice versa? What roles should Japan play in the region and in the world? How

can the U.S. and Japan switch to an integrated national security policy after 40 years of distorted policies?

Answering these questions from the context of a more equal partnership, attacking world problems and integrating national security policy provide the best foundation for developing the answer and achieving President Bush's New World Order.■



APPENDIX 1

TREATY
OF
MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY
BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN

The United States of America and Japan,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

ARTICLE III

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

ARTICLE IX

The Security Treaty between the United States of America ad Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon entering into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

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